Nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program
Iranian nuclear program is completely peaceful and has always been carrying out under supervision of the IAEA. This program does not pose any threat to any country due to its peaceful nature. As the Great Leader and other high-ranking officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have repeatedly announced, WMDs including nuclear weapons do not have any place in Iran’s defense doctrine. The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the main victims of use of WMDs and Iran is the first country that has proposed the plan for making the Middle-East free from nuclear weapons and has always been reiterating its position in this respect.
Main Objectives of the Iranian Nuclear Program
The Islamic Republic of Iran is after nothing beyond its legitimate rights as stipulated in the NPT wishing to enjoy its inalienable rights in return for meeting its obligations. The prime target of the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to nuclear energy is the production of nuclear electricity. Due to the limited resources of fossil fuels, the right of future generations to use this energy resource and detrimental impact of use of fossil fuels on environment as well as growing population and economy and increasing need to energy resources, and preferable use of oil in processing industries, the Islamic Republic of Iran can not remain dependant merely on the fossil fuels and has to diversify its required energy resources. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as its main program to develop its nuclear plants, has to produce 20000 megawatts electricity by 2025 based on the growth factors of its economy as well as decision of the Parliament. Based on its long term plan Iran has to provide the required fuel for its nuclear plants from internal and external resources. But the discriminatory and double standard policies adopted by big powers all have made Iran follow up the localization policy of its nuclear fuel production.
Policy of Cooperation and Removing Ambiguities
The Islamic Republic of Iran has so far showed its high tolerance and good will for removing ambiguities on its nuclear policies and by adoption of confidence building measures has gone far beyond its obligations. In fact, Iran has extended its full cooperation with the IAEA inspectors and other concerned parties and has always been announcing its preparedness for settling remaining issues and removing ambiguities, if any, and negotiating on issues of mutual concerns. More than 4500 person/per day inspection to the Iranian nuclear facilities and activities, voluntary suspension of all enrichment related activities for more than two and half years, signing the Additional Protocol, voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol for more than two years, full and unlimited access of inspectors to all Iranian nuclear installations and materials, granting permits for supplementary access to installations based on the Additional Protocol, granting access to more than 26 military sites, presentation of more than 1000 pages of initial statements according to the Additional Protocol and making them up to date, as well as Iranian initiative presented by the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the UN General Assembly for participation of interested governments and foreign companies in enrichment process in Iran, all are a part of activities and cooperation extended by the Islamic Republic of Iran in this respect in order to remove ambiguities. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran still is committed to its obligations under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement given the fact that the inspection program of the Agency have been continuing without any obstacle and delay according to the said Agreement. All nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran including enrichment are taking place according to the Agency’s Statute, NPT and Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and under constant surveillance of the IAEA by sending its inspection teams (undeclared or preplanned) and its cameras. Due to this policy of cooperation, Director General of the IAEA has repeatedly concluded that the Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran and all these activities remain under peaceful purposes. But regrettably it should be noted that this constructive attitude faced unjust and improper responses by sending this merely technical issue to the UNSC.
Iranian Nuclear Program Is Not a Matter of International Concerns
What are raised as concerns of the international community vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear activities are in fact concerns of a certain states vis-à-vis the progress and development of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Different statements issued by NAM in different meetings of the Board of Governors and the statement issued by the NAM TROIKA, as well as the statement issued by the NAM Heads of States and Ministerial Meetings along with the statement issued at the OIC meeting in Baku in support of the Iranian peaceful nuclear activities, all considered as a witness to the disagreement of a great part of the international community (more than 120 states) vis-à-vis the discriminative trend in this respect and establishment of an illegitimate drive for depriving developing states from accessing to advanced technologies and its monopoly in favor of certain number of states.
Suspension of Enrichment Related Activities
On the suspension of uranium enrichment which today mistakenly is considered as a key solution to the pending negotiations, but in fact is a previously tested approach by the Islamic Republic of Iran, it shall be notified that suspension of enrichment was in fact a voluntary and legally non-binding measure which could not continue for unlimited period of time. After three years of full cooperation with the IAEA and taking voluntary measures even beyond its legal obligations with the purpose of building confidence on its nuclear activities, the Islamic Republic of Iran achieved nothing. Presentation of certain economic and trade incentives by Europe in return for Iran’s deprivation of its legitimate and legal rights in enrichment process and fuel cycle, was not acceptable by our side and therefore we did not feel any need to continue the suspension. This occurs while based on several reports of the IAEA all the nuclear activities and materials in Iran have been verified and no diversion towards prohibited purposes has been detected.
Security Council and Nuclear Issue
Contrary to provisions of the IAEA Statute, the Iranian nuclear dossier was referred to the Security Council. Based on Paragraph C of Article 12 of the IAEA Statute this is the responsibility of the IAEA and its inspectors to decide on the possible diversion of the nuclear activities to military purposes of its member states. Then the related report shall be conveyed to the Board of Governors by the IAEA Director General. This occurs while up to now no diversion of Iran’s activities has been reported by the inspectors and instead they have admitted to Iran's peaceful purposes and activities. Unfortunately the referral of Iran dossier to the Security Council was made because of Iran’s resumption of suspended enrichment process (research and development in enrichment) which as stipulated by the Boards of Governors was just a non-biding and voluntary measure taken by Iran for more than two years. Despite all Iran’s cooperation and non-diversion of its activities, certain states with political purposes have been and are trying to divert Iran dossier from its legal path in order to impose their political will upon the Agency and deprive Iran from its legitimate and inalienable rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It must be admitted that there is no legal, logical and even political justification for involvement and action of the Security Council in this respect. Any action by the Security Council will damage and weaken the principles and foundations of the NPT and the UN Charter. It is so unfortunate that the US and certain nuclear countries who possess nuclear weapons and do not adhere to their obligations within NPT, consider themselves as guardians of the NPT and in order to deviate the public opinion from their own nuclear arsenal, based on false and untrue information point finger of accusation to a country in whose defense and security doctrine there is no place for WMDs. In this respect, unfortunately they misuse international institutes and organizations whose legitimacy lies in their impartiality and being away from politically biased approach and damage their credibility more than ever before. The route to the Security Council does not provide any help to the settlement of the issue but further complicate the related outlook. This occurs while the Zionist regime refrains from signing international treaties and without any global and international pressure for accepting international supervising measures is developing its nuclear arsenal vertically and horizontally. The same states that make the Security Council exercise pressure and punishment upon Iran for its peaceful nuclear activities prevent the Security Council from taking any action even limited one, against Zionist regime in order to make this regime obey the NPT rules and regulations.
Imposition of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran will be followed by reverse consequences and they never are of preventive nature for the Islamic Republic of Iran for continuing its legitimate activities. Due to 29 years experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran, sanctions only will boost its drive towards independence, self sufficiency and progress in all fields. Threat of use or use of sanctions in itself is a solid reason for Iran to maintain its independence and self-sufficiency.
As the Islamic Republic of Iran has repeatedly announced there has been and there is no undeclared nuclear activity or material in Iran. IAEA Director General made his first visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2000. During the said visit he was informed of Iran’s intention for carrying out activities on fuel cycle and construction of some facilities for this purpose like production of UCF. Despite the fact that at that time Iran was not a signatory to the new subsidiary arrangements, but filled out and sent the related questionnaire on the design of the nuclear facilities in Isfahan and other fuel cycle activities to the Agency in 2000. In fact the Agency was informed of Iranian activities 4 years earlier than the time when Iran had to do it based on its obligations to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The Director General also visited Natanz facilities on Feb 2nd 2003. For the Director General it was quite clear that Iran, according to the Safeguards Agreement, was not compelled to present the related questionnaire to the Agency before the visit. According to the Safeguards Agreement Iran had to take this action 180 days before import of materials to the facilities. In fact, despite no obligation in this respect Iran took measure for making its activities more transparent. Therefore using the term of “undeclared” or “covert actions” in this respect is definitely out of question and wrong. It must be reiterated that all previous nuclear activities of Iran which must be declared based on the IAEA Statute and Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, have already been declared by the Iranian side. It must also be emphasized that none of the those activities were classified as prohibited ones based on the NPT or the IAEA Statute. Besides, the Agency has stipulated that evaluation of existence of undeclared nuclear material in the member states is a time consuming process. As we read in the Report on the implementation of the Safeguards (SIR) in 2006, more the 120 member states including 10 developed states that possess advanced nuclear technologies have not yet received the confirmation of non-existence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities yet. Therefore, magnifying Iranian case is something which is not justifiable by no means.
Enrichment Activities in Natanz
As the Agency is well informed, information on the design of FEP in Natanz was presented to the Agency in its first phase of construction in April 2003. Since then these information have become up to date on daily basis and it has been verified by the inspectors repeatedly. All activities and measures taken in FEP in Natanz have taken place according to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and under the surveillance of the Agency and transfer of UF6 materials have been carried out in presence of the IAEA inspectors and currently the related process are monitored by the Agency’s cameras and materials have been sealed accordingly. In short, safeguard related measures which include unannounced and declared inspections, installment of cameras and camera monitoring, sealing the materials, sample taking have been carried out and are being carried out.
In the recent reports of the IAEA Director General, again statements and of the Islamic Republic of Iran on non existence of reprocessing activities in Iran were confirmed. Therefore, any request to cease the activity which does not exists and referring to this issue in the Security Council resolutions, is not legally based and reasonable.
IR40 (Heavy Water Research Reactor)
Heavy water research reactor as it was already announced will replace Tehran 5 megawatt research reactor whose function will end presently. The new reactor will produce isotopes for medical, agricultural and industrial purposes. The Agency is well aware that the Research Reactor in Arak (IR-40) is under civil construction. In accordance with the provision of the procedure of the modified code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements, the Islamic Republic of Iran has provided the Design Information Questioner (DIQ) on 24 April 2003, and subsequently revised versions of the DIQ were submitted to the Agency in four phases; i.e. on 8 July 2003, 30 November 200, 8 May 2004 and 12 June 2006. The Agency has verified these DIQs and inspected the 1R-40 frequently. Having considered that the Research Reactor IR-40 is in its civil construction phase and far beyond the stage of implementing the measures envisaged in Article 46 of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, therefore there is no justification for requesting further inspection in accordance with the code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements agreed on 12 February 1976. The implementation of the modified code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Safeguards Agreement, accepted in 2003, was aimed at enhancing Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA and the Islamic Republic of Iran will continue the implementation of the code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements as agreed on 12 February 1976.
Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements
The nuclear issue of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been referred to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in contravention with the provisions of the Statute of the IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been peaceful with no diversion to military purposes, and all have been in consent with Iran's legal obligations under the NPT, with no threat to international peace and security. The continuation of adoption of resolutions by the UNSC against Iran, shall only complicate the situation, and in no way helps the resolution of the issue, undermining the efforts and initiatives to restart the negotiations. In view of the above, according to the law passed by the parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2006, and considering the illegal and unlawful United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 on 14 March 2007 against Iranian Nation and its peaceful nuclear activities, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has decided that as long as the full implementation of the provisions on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), specifically achieving the inalienable rights stipulated in Article IV of the Treaty and the cessation of perusing Iran's nuclear dossier within the United Nations Security Council, its full disengagement, and thus the return of the dossier to the framework of the IAEA, in full, is not realized, and as long as potential military adventures are not removed from the table and threats to Iran's security are not eliminated, further implementation of the modified code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Safeguards Agreement, accepted in 2003, but not yet ratified by the parliament, aimed at enhancing Iran's cooperation with the IAEA, has been suspended and Iran reverted to implement the codes 3.1 as reflected in the Subsidiary Arrangements on 12 February 1976.
Safety of Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant
Since the contract for completing the Bushahr Nuclear power plant was signed with Russian Party, Iranian Atomic Energy Organization has always given priority to the safety of this nuclear power plant. To this end, within the contract concluded between this Organization and the Russian Party, the Russian Contractor was assigned to observe rules and regulations of the Iranian nuclear safety standards as well as that of the IAEA and certain western states in addition to that of the Russian side. In this respect, it shall be notified that during the last 10 years Iran enjoyed close technical cooperation with the IAEA on various related areas which included the following: Preparation and drawing up nuclear safety rules and regulations, inspection and supervision of different phases of the nuclear plant construction, creation of quality control management system in the nuclear safety system, reconsideration of environmental impacts of the nuclear power plant, education and training experts required in the nuclear safety system,… . On the other hand, authorities of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization have announced preparedness of the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide the Persian Gulf littoral states with the documents on the safety of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in order for the experts of those states to go through the Safety measures taken by Iranian concerned authorities. This occurs while the Islamic Republic of Iran attaches paramount importance to the safety of its nuclear plant staff, their families and people living around the nuclear installations and facilities.