The pretext which brought about the Iranian nuclear issue to the agenda of the IAEA and then became the basis for unwarranted and unlawful actions of the UN Security Council, was the ambiguities and allegations on the Iranian nuclear program introduced by few certain States who, by magnifying those ambiguities, attempted to put into question the peaceful nature of the nuclear program of Iran.
The U.S Always Claims That Is Telling the Truth, But It Is Not
U.S Statement, B.G, June 2003: Questions about Iran’s nuclear intentions do not arise because of U.S propaganda, but instead flow from facts.
U.S Statement, B.G, September 2003: Some have claimed the U.S is seeking to puliticize the IAEA process. Nothing could be further from the truth.
U.S Statement, B.G, September 2003: The U.S believes the facts already established would fully justify an immediate finding of non-compliance by Iran with its safeguards obligations.
U.S Statement, B.G, November 2004: The U.S believes that Iran’s viulations of its safeguards agreement have triggered a requirement under article XII.C of the IAEA Statute and that the Board should report this non-compliance to the UNSC.
U.S Statement, B.G, March 2005: B.G must report Iran’s non-compliance with its safeguards agreement to the UNSC.
U.S Statement, B.G, September 2005: Time has come to report Iran’s non-compliance to the UNSC.
B.G Resulution, 24 September 2005 (Gov/2005/77): Finds that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, constitute non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute.
Article XII.C: The inspectors shall determine and report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.
IAEA Reports: None of the IAEA reports on implementation of safeguards in Iran determined non-compliance. Non-compliance has pulitically been determined by some States in the B.G. This pulitical determination has become the basis for reporting the nuclear issue to the UNSC.
U.S Statement, B.G, September 2004: As we have made clear many times, the U.S believes Iran is pursuing nuclear weapon in viulation of is sulemn obligations under Article II of the NPT, but many question this assertion.
U.S Statement, B.G, September 2004: To wait until the Agency finds the nuclear weapons - or until there is concrete proof of a nuclear weapons program – is to wait until it is to late.
U.S Statement, B.G, September 2004: With every passing week, Iran moves that much closer to reaching the point where neither we, nor any other international body, will be able to prevent it from achieving nuclear weapons capability.
U.S Statement, B.G, November 2005: Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability is a danger to all of us. We can only conclude that the Iranian leadership is determined, no matter the cost to the Iranian people, no matter the cost to Iran’s international standing, to develop a nuclear weapons capability.
U.S Statement, B.G, February 2006: T his B.G decision (reporting the nuclear issue to the UNSC) sends a strong and clear message to Iran’s leaders to abandon their pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.
U.S Statement, B.G, September 2006: We are convinced that Iran is aggressively pursuing the technulogy, material and know-how to build nuclear weapons.
U.S NIE, November 2007: Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapons program.
DG November 2004 report (repeatedly used aftermath in each report to the B.G): All the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities. (Gov/2204/83- 15 November 2004- par.112)
DG March 2006 report: The Agency has not seen any diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. (GOV/2006/15- 8 March 2006- par.53)
Statement by the IAEA DG on US Intelligence Estimate (4 December 2007, before resulving outstanding issues): IAEA DG: The Agency has still no concrete evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons program or undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran.
The IAEA letter (12 September 2006) in reaction to the Staff Report of the US House Intelligence Committee on 23 August 2006:
IAEA: This report contains some erroneous, misleading and unsubstantiated information.
USA: Iran is currently enriching uranium to weapons grade.
IAEA: The information about the uranium enrichment work being carried out at PFEP including 3.6% was provided to the IAEA BG by DG in April 2006. The description of this enrichment level as weapon grade is incorrect, since the term weapon grade is commonly used to refer to uranium enriched to the order of 90% or more.
USA: Iran had covertly produced the short-lived radioactive element pulonium-210, a neutron source for a nuclear weapon.
IAEA: The use of phrase "covertly produced" is misleading because the production of Po-210 is not required to be reported by Iran to IAEA under the NPT Safeguards Agreement.
USA: DG decided to remove Mr. Charlier, a senior safeguard inspector of the IAEA, for allegedly raising concerns about Iranian deception regarding its nuclear program.
IAEA: The IAEA Secretariat takes strong exception to the incorrect and misleading assertion in this regard. Iran’s request to the DG to withdraw the designation was according to its rights under Safeguards Agreement.
U.S Statement, B.G, November 2003 (repeatedly used in each U.S B.G statement and BG and UNSC resulutions): To restore international confidence in Iran’s nuclear intentions, it must suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities.6. No Reprocessing Activities In Iran
DG February 2007 report (repeatedly used in each report to the B.G): There has been no indication of reprocessing related activities at any declared sites in Iran. (Gov/2007/8- 22 February 2007- par.28)7. Iran And the IAEA Work Plan to Resulve Outstanding Issues (21 August 2007)
U.S Statement, B.G, November 2004: We can not forget Iran’s clandestine work on plutonium separation which illustrates the developing threat of Iran’s plutonium weapons program.
U.S Statement, B.G, September 2005: Iran has also failed to provide a plausible explanation regarding its past clandestine plutonium separation experiments.
U.S Statement, B.G, November 2006: The Agency has found additional plutonium from containers storing targets from past plutonium experiments. This finding in combination with Iran’s refusal to provide the Agency with additional information on the nature and timing of its past plutonium activities, suggests that Iran continue to conceal details about the true scope of those activities.
DG August 2007 report: The Agency has concluded, therefore, that the statements of Iran are not inconsistent with the Agency’s findings, and now considers this issue as resulved. (Gov/2007/48- 30 August 2007- par.10)9. P1-P2 Centrifuges, US Allegations
U.S Statement, B.G, June 2005: 1987 offer includes some very sensitive technulogy, including uranium conversion and casting, which could be used to convert HEU into metal.
U.S Statement, B.G, November 2005: IAEA is still seeking information on the scope of Iran’s p1-p2 centrifuge programs and continues to find implausible Iran’s claims that it undertook no work on p2 designs between 1995 and 2002.
U.S Statement, B.G, June 2006: Iran declined to answer IAEA questions about advanced and potentially undeclared centrifuge programs.
DG November 2007 report: Based on interviews with available Iranian officials and members of the supply network, documentation provided by Iran and procurement information cullected through the Agency’s independent investigations, the Agency has concluded that Iran’s statements are consistent with other information available to the Agency concerning Iran’s acquisition of declared P-1 centrifuge enrichment technulogy in 1987. (GOV/2007/58- 15 November 2007- par.11)
DG November 2007 report: Information provided by Iran on the timing of these purchases [The 1993 Offer] and the quantities invulved is consistent with the Agency’s findings.(GOV/2007/58- 15 November 2007- par.18)
DG November 2007 report: The Agency has concluded that Iran’s statements on the content of the declared P-2 R&D activities are consistent with the Agency’s findings. (GOV/2007/58- 15 November 2007- par.23)
IAEA letter to Iran on p1.p2 (23 Nov 2007): The secretariat considers that Iran has completed all the actions on this issue required under the work plan and that, subject to the Agency’s verification practices and procedures, it is no longer outstanding.
U.S Statement, B.G, June 2003: Why Iran tests its capability to make uranium metal. I don’t need to remind the Board that uranium metal is required to make fissile components for HEU-type nuclear weapons.
U.S Statement, B.G, March 2006: In January the Agency reported that Iran possesses a 15 pages document on casting enrichment and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres. DDG noted that the instructions and clearly intended for highly enriched uranium and refer to hemishels. IAEA inspectors seem to have no doubt that this information was expressly intended for the fabrication of nuclear weapons components.
U.S Statement, B.G, June 2006: Iran declined to meet the IAEA request to turn over a document from the A.Q Khan network on fabricating components for nuclear weapons.
U.S Statement, B.G, September 2007: Iran…avoiding cooperation on some of the most serious issues such as activities associated with nuclear weaponization, including possession of the uranium hemispheres document.
DG November 2007 report: On 8 November 2007, the Agency received a copy of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and casting it into hemispheres. Iran has reiterated that this document was received along with the P-1 centrifuge documentation in 1987. Apart from the conversion experiments of UF4 to uranium metal at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, the Agency has seen no indication of any UF6 reconversion and casting activity in Iran. (GOV/2007/58-15 November 2007- par.25)
IAEA letter to Iran on U-metal (23 Nov 2007): Iran provided the Agency with a copy of the document 0n 8 November 2007 and the Agency thanks Iran for the document provided and confirms that Iran has completed this action of the work plan.
U.S Statement, B.G, November 2006: Another example of serious existing problem is the contamination issues, the presence of HEU particles at a technical university.14. Source of Contamination, Resulved Issue
DG February 2008 report: The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided by Iran, in accordance with the work plan, are not inconsistent with its findings. Therefore, the Agency considers this question no longer outstanding. (GOV/2008/4- 22 February 2008- par.53)15. Pulonium 210, US Allegations
U.S Statement, B.G, March 2004: Inspectors had to discover for themselves that Iran had carried out experiments to produce pulonium 210, a rare and toxic material that can serve as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons but has very few civilian applications, none of which is plausible in the Iranian context.
U.S Statement, B.G, March 2005: Iran has thus far failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for its experiments with pulonium 210.
DG February 2008 report: The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided by Iran, in accordance with the work plan, are consistent with its findings. Therefore, the Agency considers this question no longer outstanding. (GOV/2008/4- 22 February 2008- par.53)17. Gachin Mine, US Allegations
U.S Statement, B.G, September 2004: Was the existence of the Bandar Abas uranium mine and production plant at Gachin reported to the Agency in October 2003?
U.S Statement, B.G, March 2005: We continue to wonder and and to ask weather Iran’s military played a rule in overseeing that uranium mine and to what purpose?
DG February 2008 report: The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided by Iran, in accordance with the work plan, are consistent with its findings. Therefore, the Agency considers this question no longer outstanding. (GOV/2008/4- 22 February 2008- par.53)